POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

adopted by the

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

in 2012
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RESOLUTION 393

on
THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Assembly,

1. **Affirming** its commitment to peaceful development of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region;

2. **Convinced** that dictatorial regimes cannot ensure sustainable stability in the region;

3. **Welcoming wholeheartedly** the significant strides that have been made across the region towards democracy, pluralism and the rule of law; and **recognising** the tangible progress in building new state institutions, drafting new constitutions and conducting competitive and fair elections, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya;

4. **Believing** that the international community can make a meaningful contribution assisting the new governments and parliaments to address the numerous challenges in the process of democratic transition, including daunting socio-economic problems, protection of the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities, the relation between state and religion, protection of the new-found freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, development of a viable political party system and strengthening of the civilian control of the defence and security sector;

5. **Deeply disappointed** that women are underrepresented in the new parliaments and governments as well as in constitution drafting bodies; and **strongly condemning** the recurrent violent acts against women in countries affected by uprisings, including cases of murder, rape, torture, injuries, kidnapping, harassment and other physical and psychological abuse;

6. **Concerned** about the influence fundamentalist attitudes might have on gender equality and minority rights, but **convincing** that exclusion of significant political movements from institutionalised political process would be counterproductive, and **trusting** democratic instincts and political maturity of the overwhelming majority of people in the MENA countries;

7. **Deploring** the killing of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans at the Consulate in Benghazi and any and all attacks on diplomatic missions everywhere;

8. **Welcoming** the Alliance’s commitment, reaffirmed by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Summit in Chicago in May 2012, to strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in the region through the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative as well as bilateral consultations;

9. **PLEDGES** its own support, when requested, for the democratic institutions in the MENA region, in particular the newly-elected parliaments, offering to make full use of the instruments and mechanisms the Assembly has in its arsenal;

Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.
10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO:

   a. to send a strong signal of solidarity to the people of countries where uprisings took place, reaffirming the values-based approach towards the region;

   b. to explore ways of strengthening and developing NATO partnerships with these countries adapting to the new realities in the region;

   c. to step up practical support for building democratic state institutions in the MENA region, based on demand-driven and tailored co-operation mechanisms, with a particular focus on good governance, independent judiciary and the efficient civil control of the armed forces and security services;

   d. to offer programmes designed to support the region’s civil societies, media, local institutions and business communities directly rather than exclusively through central governments;

   e. to follow vigilantly the developments in the field of gender equality and minority rights and to react swiftly and vocally should these rights come under threat;

   f. to improve co-ordination of efforts with the EU, the UN and other international actors in facilitating democratic reforms, security and stability of the MENA region, including in the field of post-conflict “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration”;

   g. to increase investment in research and training of experts on the MENA region;

11. **CALLS UPON** all political leaders in the MENA region:

   a. to ensure that the transition process towards democracy is based on the principles of inclusiveness, protection of fundamental human rights and gender equality;

   b. to take urgent steps to ensure safety of the weakest and the most vulnerable groups in their societies;

   c. to promote regional co-operation and integration in order to share the best practices of the democratic transition and social security policies;

12. **CALLS UPON** the Libyan authorities to consider the potential benefits of NATO partnership mechanisms.
RESOLUTION 394

on

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD*

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** NATO’s firm commitment to democratic principles and to partnerships based on shared values;

2. **Stressing** the important context of the forthcoming 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on Distinctive Partnership, Ukraine’s 2013 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Rome Declaration, the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Georgia’s declaration of its aspirations to NATO membership;

3. **Commending** the important role of Eastern partners for Euro-Atlantic security and **appreciating** in particular Belarus’ membership in the Partnership for Peace Programme, Russia’s constructive co-operation with NATO, Ukraine’s intensive partnership based on the Annual National Programme and the shared goal of bringing Ukraine closer to European integration, Georgia’s active co-operation with NATO through the NATO-Georgia Commission as well as its very significant contribution to NATO-led operations;

4. **Recognising** the exclusive ownership of the political process by the people of Belarus, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine;

5. **Aware** of significant differences in political systems of these countries, but **noting** a trend towards deteriorating democratic standards and **deploring** in particular restrictions on civil rights activists, media freedom, the non-conformity of elections to international standards and acts of selective application of justice in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine;

6. **Commending** efforts towards further democratisation based on inclusive dialogue in the Russian Federation, while **noting with concern** reversal or stalemate of political reforms;

7. **Commending** recent democratic parliamentary elections in Georgia regarded as a litmus test for Georgia’s democratic development and **commending** the first ever electoral transfer of power in that country;

8. **Noting** a well-conducted polling process in the recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine, but **concerned** about the increased number of irregularities in the pre-election period;

9. **Condemning** the continuous repression of democratic opposition, civil society and independent media, in Belarus and **regretting** the undisguised neglect of OSCE commitments in recent elections;

*Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.*
10. **CALLS UPON** governments and parliaments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine:

a. to reaffirm and to support with concrete action their international commitment to shared democratic values;

b. to reverse the current deteriorating trend in respect of democracy and human rights, to conduct genuine and lasting democratic reforms based on inclusive dialogue and to fully respect international obligations and commitments;

c. to fully investigate electoral process irregularities – in the case of Ukraine, particularly in single-mandate districts – and implement recommendations of authoritative international election observation institutions;

d. to release without delay political prisoners and to strengthen the rule of law;

e. to stop the harassment of and lift restrictions on civil society organisations and independent media;

11. **CALLS UPON** the new parliament and government of Georgia and the current President to continue the reforms programme and ensure effective cohabitation until the presidential election of October 2013;

12. **EXPRESSES CONCERN** over the reported pressure on local self-government institutions and particularly the Georgian Public Broadcaster and **CALLS UPON** the new government of Georgia to refrain from politically motivated arrests;

13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO:

a. to redouble efforts in supporting the democratic aspirations of the people in the Eastern neighbourhood in full respect of the sovereignty of Belarus, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine;

b. to place democratic principles at the heart of the new NATO partnership policy;

c. to seize every possible opportunity to remind authorities of these neighbouring countries that they are expected to honour all their international commitments in the areas of human rights and democracy;

d. to co-operate closely to support the freedom and fundamental human rights of the people of Belarus, by defining, inter alia, their position on participation in the 2014 Ice Hockey World championship in this country;

e. to continue assisting Ukraine with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the Annual National Programme;

f. to invite Georgia, in accordance with the decisions of the Bucharest and Chicago Summits of NATO and in recognition of its democratic progress, to make a step further in the context of its Euro-Atlantic integration and to consider granting it a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in order to ensure more comprehensive scrutiny over its political and institutional reforms.
RESOLUTION 395
on
AFGHANISTAN: ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION*

The Assembly,

1. **Reaffirming** the vital role of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in ensuring the enduring security of Afghanistan and the region;

2. **Reaffirming further** the continued commitment of NATO to Afghan security and stability after the end of the ISAF mission in 2014, as underlined in the Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan;

3. **Praising** the success of NATO and the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) in improving security in Afghanistan, **noting** the remaining challenges, and **commending** the decreasing number of civilian casualties;

4. **Strongly condemning** attacks on ISAF personnel by members of the ANSF, but **welcoming** the joint efforts being taken to oppose the insider threat;

5. **Wholeheartedly supporting** the Istanbul Process, the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, the Regional Economic Co-operation Conferences on Afghanistan and other international efforts to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and the wider region;

6. **Emphasising** the need to engage all actors within and outside Afghanistan willing to support the peaceful coexistence and solidarity of the Afghan people;

7. **Commending** ISAF and ANSF on the successful ongoing transition of authority (**Inteqal**) process;

8. **Recognising** the key importance of Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia as transit states that ensure the success of ongoing operations and the future withdrawal;

9. **Stressing** the crucial importance of ISAF participants abiding by their previously declared withdrawal plans as agreed upon at the relevant NATO conferences;

10. **Acknowledging** the value of reintegrating former insurgents who renounce violence and their terrorist ties and recognise the Afghan Constitution as a means of ensuring peace and solidarity of the Afghan people and **praising** the efforts of the APRP (Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme) and the Afghan leadership in this regard;

11. **Conceding** the continued economic challenges faced by the Afghan government to maintain on its own its security and the prosperity of its people for the years to come, and **stressing further** the need for international financial and technical support in building the capacities of the Afghan government and civil society;

*Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.*
12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance, ISAF, and NATO:

a. to take necessary measures, in co-operation with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, to prevent the recent spike in insider attacks from impacting troop morale, further undermining trust between ISAF and ANSF and jeopardising future co-operation;

b. to continue offering robust security and development aid to Afghan governmental and non-governmental organisations for the years to come;

c. to ensure that women have an effective voice and role throughout the peace process;

d. to ensure that domestic political pressures do not lead to countries abandoning commitments to the current troop withdrawal schedule and endangering the success of the decade-long NATO mission;

e. to increase literacy training for the ANP (Afghan National Police) and ANA (Afghan National Army) members;

f. to establish means for offering vocational training to former members of the ANSF as forces are downsized in the coming year;

g. to promote co-operation with Islamabad both for the purposes of ISAF withdrawals and for the future security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, especially with regard to the insurgent activity in North/Northwestern Pakistan;

h. to aid and urge the Afghan leadership to address corruption within the ranks of the ANSF and the Afghan government in general;

i. to intensify efforts to counter production and trade of narcotics which often underwrite terrorist activities;

j. to facilitate amicable relations between Kabul and other international actors and lay the foundation for future international initiatives with regional neighbours;

k. to encourage both NATO and non-NATO countries not to lose focus and to continue investing in Afghan security and the well-being of the Afghan people;

l. to hold President Karzai and his government accountable for transparency and corruption issues;

m. to continue to promote respect for human rights and gender equality in Afghanistan after 2014;

n. to ensure that Afghanistan has the necessary means after 2014 to develop a sound market economy independent of drug production and trafficking and to promote agricultural diversification.
RESOLUTION 396

on

ARCTIC ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITY STAKES

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that profound climatic changes are underway in the Arctic and that this is having a dramatic impact on the region’s fauna, flora and human communities;

2. **Noting** that more comprehensive data and more sophisticated environmental models are needed to understand better the critical changes affecting biodiversity, fish stocks, atmospheric conditions, coastal and underwater geology, as well as permafrost, snow, ice and water conditions in the High North;

3. **Acknowledging** that a recent influx of people to the Arctic has become an important source of change and potential tension particularly with indigenous inhabitants;

4. **Understanding** that the Arctic is becoming an increasingly dynamic economic region that could generate wealth particularly for those firms that build an early lead in the fields of energy and mineral resources, fishing, commercial route development, and tourism;

5. **Taking into consideration** the importance of proper precautions to avoid spills in deep Arctic waters while oil and gas drilling;

6. **Noting** that warming trends and receding ice are creating new opportunities not only for more commercial activity but also for increased military activities;

7. **Recognising** that growing economic activity is transforming the High North into a theatre of economic, maritime and transportation co-operation;

8. **Concerned** by the dearth of search and rescue capabilities at a moment when human activity in the High North, including mass tourism, is taking off;

9. **Appreciating** that the members of the Arctic Council maintain co-operation;

10. **Noting** that an increasing number of non-littoral states want to play a role in the Arctic;

11. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to co-ordinate their support for scientific endeavours to understand more deeply the climatic transformation underway in the Arctic and its implications for that fragile region and the planet as a whole;

b. to ensure that interstate relations and Arctic economic development adhere to key international conventions and rules, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

*Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.*
c. to encourage international actors to settle outstanding disputes over Arctic boundaries, resources and policies, and to establish new rules of engagement where needed in relevant international fora, including the International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council;

d. to recognise the important contribution the Arctic Council can make as a forum for dialogue among Arctic and key non-Arctic actors;

e. to ensure greater transparency on matters related to military deployments and strategies in the Arctic region, including through dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council;

f. to minimise the presence of forces operating in the region insofar as this is prudent and feasible;

g. to develop strict regulatory and monitoring frameworks governing oil and gas drilling in the deep seas of the High North to minimise the risk of catastrophic accidents in this highly fragile environment;

h. to contribute to improving search and rescue, disaster planning and other emergency capabilities that are sufficiently robust to cope with the kinds of disasters that are likely to occur because of increased human activity;

i. to ensure that the potential costs of clean-ups and rescues are adequately reflected in the total price of doing business in this remote region;

j. to work with key international partners to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of international co-operation rather than a theater of international rivalry and tension.
The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that ongoing financial crises in the Euro zone are having a significant impact on national budgets and long-term defence spending;

2. **Worried** that the resulting fiscal pressures are making it ever more difficult to underwrite the costs of national defence at levels commensurate with traditional measures of security;

3. **Concerned** about the economic and security consequences of European financial and economic difficulties for the entire transatlantic community;

4. **Appreciating** that the European Union has developed an institutional framework to allow it to play a more significant role in international affairs and potentially reinforce its capacity to defend collective European security interests and contribute to allied defence;

5. **Understanding** that today’s international system is highly unstable and that Europe and the United States confront a range of common emerging threats;

6. **Recognising** that although European contributions to NATO-led or US-led operations are not as large as those made by the United States, they are nonetheless militarily significant and an important expression of transatlantic solidarity;

7. **Concerned** by the potentially negative effect that economic downturns in parts of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe might have on European cohesion and solidarity;

8. **Noting** that a number of European countries are implementing major defence budget cuts to cope with serious fiscal crisis and that most EU member states clearly have fewer resources to devote to defence;

9. **Noting** that some governments are targeting the defence sector for excessive spending cuts that could undermine European security and erode European and Alliance solidarity;

10. **Concerned** by the looming tendency to favour the short-sighted job creating dimension of national defence budgets over long-term investments in equipment, research and development;

11. **Recognising** that Europe has the capacity to bolster defence spending efficiency significantly through common procurement programmes, shared planning, deeper military co-ordination and more open defence markets;

12. **Applauding** the call by NATO heads of government meeting in Chicago for an effort to ensure that NATO’s Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing;

*Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.*
13. **Noting** that US Congressional support for the North Atlantic Alliance becomes more difficult to defend politically as the gap between European and US defence spending widens, particularly as the United States has also confronted serious economic and fiscal difficulties over the last four years;

14. **URGES** European member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to refrain from making further defence spending cuts that would endanger core national and collective security interests;

   b. to redouble efforts to pool military resources, deepen procurement and Research and Development collaboration, rationalise defence infrastructure, and find new and innovative ways to share assets and defence responsibilities in order to avoid operational duplication and to increase efficiency and effectiveness;

   c. to rebalance defence spending so that a higher share of resources is devoted to equipment procurement, research and operations and less on personnel, so that Europe’s future defence posture is credible over the long term;

   d. to find new ways to deepen collaboration between NATO and the EU in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of both institutions, to eliminate expensive duplication and to develop Smart Defence in close consultation with the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative;

   e. to reach out to European publics to explain the nature of security risks and the need to develop capabilities to manage these risks in the most effective and efficient manner possible;

15. **URGES** all member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to revitalize efforts to build a more open transatlantic defence market which will enhance defence spending efficiency in North America and in Europe;

   b. to look to NATO as a vehicle for generating deeper allied co-operation and co-ordination, which is the key to improving defence spending efficiency;

   c. to exchange more information on long-term defence budgeting priorities to ensure that any national cuts are made rationally and in a manner that deepens integration and solidarity rather than foments discord.
The Assembly,

1. **Convinced** that NATO remains pivotal in securing peace, prosperity and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

2. **Emphasising** that NATO's core mission remains collective defence, but **recognising** that today's security threats - including failed or failing states, regional instability, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, terrorism, cyber security, and maritime piracy - are no longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region but are global in nature;

3. **Welcoming** the agreements reached at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits as cornerstones for the continuing transformation of the Alliance which will allow it to meet current and future threats;

4. **Noting** in particular the effort to acquire and deploy joint capabilities to meet the Alliance's core tasks agreed in the new NATO Strategic Concept and the effort in implementing a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure;

5. **Recognising** that NATO's transformation process is taking place in a difficult international security environment, characterised, among others, by continuing decreasing defence expenditures in Europe, the emergence of new centres of power, the transition in Afghanistan, and the developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region;

6. **Recognising** that the ongoing financial and economic crisis continues to put considerable strain on the public expenditures of the Allies;

7. **Convinced** that fair burden-sharing among member states is essential to preserve the solidarity which is holding the Alliance together;

8. **Noting** that the Asia-Pacific region is of considerable importance to the security and economic well-being of NATO member states;

9. **Commending** the NATO Heads of State and government and the Afghan government for their commitment to an enduring partnership between the Alliance and Afghanistan beyond the transition of full security responsibility from international forces to Afghan forces by the end of 2014;

10. **Stressing** that the countries of the MENA region and the Alliance share a host of security challenges and **fully supporting** NATO's engagement with the countries of the region;

11. **Concerned** that recent developments in certain parts of the MENA region, in particular in Syria and the Sahel zone, pose a serious threat to peace and security in the region and could have a destabilising effect on Alliance member states;

*Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.*
12. **Acknowledging** the invaluable contribution of partner countries to NATO-led missions and operations and **stressing** the crucial role these partnerships play in the promotion of international peace and security;

13. **Recognising** the important role played by the Russian Federation in enhancing Euro-Atlantic and global security and the achievements of the NATO-Russia Partnership;

14. **Stressing** that NATO's Open Door policy has been successful in projecting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, and that the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of co-operative security have advanced stability in Europe;

15. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to invest adequate political, military, and financial resources to implement the decisions taken in Lisbon and in Chicago in order to maintain the current level of operational effectiveness and transatlantic interoperability and, if financial cuts are necessary, to co-ordinate them as much as possible;

   b. to develop further projects designed to bolster transatlantic cohesion and to increase their bilateral and multilateral co-operation, particularly those designed to address critical capability shortfalls;

   c. to work towards "NATO Forces 2020" in order to build modern, tightly connected, well-equipped, trained and commanded forces that can operate together and with partners in any environment;

   d. to implement the more efficient and flexible partnership policy approved in Berlin in 2011 by strengthening NATO's existing partnership tools and devising more flexible formats to discuss security challenges with partners;

   e. to implement fully their commitments to assist the government of Afghanistan in providing a secure and stable environment for its citizens beyond 2014 and to co-ordinate their policies towards Afghanistan and the region to the maximum extent possible;

   f. to reaffirm the Open Door policy and to continue assisting aspirant countries on their path to NATO membership;

   g. to develop further wide-ranging co-operation with the Russian Federation, along the terms of the Lisbon NRC (NATO-Russia Council) Summit decisions, particularly in the military-to-military sphere, stressing that this partnership needs to rest on common values as well as on the principles stipulated in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, on the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and on the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

   h. to reaffirm their commitment to assist the new democratic governments of the MENA region in providing a secure and stable environment for citizens as they work through challenging political and economic transitions;

   i. to deepen further the partnerships of the Alliance, including with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region, by formalising partnerships with countries that share the values of the Alliance and by expanding the list of shared activities while preserving the ability of each partner to form tailored co-operative relationships with the Alliance.
RESOLUTION 399

on

DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND BEYOND*

The Assembly,

1. **Condemning** the Assad regime's brutal crackdown on innocent civilians and extensive and persistent violations of human rights;

2. **Alarmed** that the crisis in Syria is taking on both sectarian and international dimensions;

3. **Strongly condemning** the shelling of locations inside Turkey by the Syrian regime's forces, including the shelling on 3 October 2012, which caused the death of five Turkish citizens and injured many;

4. **Expressing** its solidarity with Turkey in the face of these flagrant violations of its sovereignty, and the loss of innocent lives;

5. **Concerned** by the dangers that Syria's chemical weapons pose to the people of Syria and to the international community;

6. **Denouncing** the continued arming of the Assad regime by Russia, Iran and other states;

7. **Noting** that persistent divisions within the Syrian opposition, unclear links between the political and armed opposition groups, and reports of human rights abuses, undermine international support;

8. **Warning** that the longer the conflict in Syria endures, the more likely it is to attract Jihadist groups and other extremists whose goals are fundamentally undemocratic and profoundly threatening to regional stability;

9. **Conscious** that the populations access to humanitarian aid remains inadequate, and **concerned** that the economic collapse of Syria is causing enormous human suffering that will affect the country and its citizens for years;

10. **Acknowledging** the hardships endured by Syrian refugees and internally-displaced people and **recognising also** the grave burdens neighbouring states are shouldering to care for them;

11. **Regretting** that Russia and China's position in the UN Security Council is severely weakening the United Nations’ ability to put an end to the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation and to bring about a political resolution of the crisis;

12. **Emphasising** that the peaceful settlement of the ongoing conflict should remain a priority for the international community;

*Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.
13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to monitor the situation in Syria closely in order to alleviate the dangers posed to Turkey and stemming from developments in the Syrian crisis at NATO's south-eastern border;

b. to adopt a common approach to this crisis that includes an agreed roadmap for ending the conflict and assisting Syrians in building a pluralistic, inclusive and stable Syria;

c. to continue to press Russia and China to support the adoption of a robust UN Security Council resolution on Syria, which can underpin a political solution;

d. to assist the Syrian opposition to overcome current divisions, foster interethnic and intersectarian reconciliation, curb the influence of extremists, and put an end to human rights violations committed on behalf of the opposition;

e. to increase humanitarian aid into Syria and to provide more material aid to countries that are now hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees;

14. **URGES** the member countries of the UN Security Council:

a. to redouble their efforts to overcome their divisions and adopt a unified position on the Syrian crisis;

b. to sanction a Syrian-led political process that could lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict;

c. to consider, in consultation with relevant UN agencies, the Arab League and Syria’s neighbours, measures to help shelter those fleeing horrific violence within Syria;

d. to take all necessary steps to respond to the potential use or transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal.
RESOLUTION 400

on

THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

The Assembly,

1. Wholeheartedly supporting the efforts of the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) to find a comprehensive, negotiated, and long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear dispute, on the basis of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach, which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

2. Expressing its sincere regret that the recent diplomatic overtures towards Iran have, overall, been met with disinterest from the Iranian side and that progress in finding a diplomatic solution has been negligible thus far;

3. Underlining that such a diplomatic solution is in Iran’s long-term security interest as well as in the interest of the people of Iran;

4. Strongly condemning Iran’s continued non-compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Agreements and its failure to abide by the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;

5. Noting with grave concern that the IAEA is still unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore also unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful activities;

6. Noting with grave concern that Iran is moving ever-closer to a position where it could develop nuclear weapons if it so chooses, recognising that such a capability would present a threat to regional stability, global security, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to the vital interests of certain states, and acknowledging that a time may come when those states take pre-emptive action;

7. Recognising the potential value of a grace period, where Iran would not be punished for admitting to other past nuclear-related activities which were not in conformity with its international obligations;

8. Recognising Iran’s inalienable right, under the NPT, to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but underlining that this is dependent, in line with NPT provisions, on the verifiable demonstration that Iran’s nuclear programme has exclusively peaceful purposes;

9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to continue to give the fullest backing to the P5+1-led negotiations and to the efforts of the IAEA;

b. to work in concert to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue;

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 November 2012, Prague, Czech Republic.
c. to intensify their efforts to help put together a package of positive incentives that could convince Iran to find a viable solution to the nuclear dispute, including exploring the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East as a source of lasting stability and security in the region;

d. to prepare a new set of sanctions, with the broadest possible participation, and impose them if it becomes clear that Iran continues to avoid engaging in substantial talks;

10. **URGES** Iran:

a. to engage with the members of the P5+1 in talks and negotiations on the nuclear dispute, fully committed and in good faith;

b. to comply fully and promptly with all its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions;

c. to redouble co-operation with the IAEA, in order to reach, without delay, a structured approach that would clarify all outstanding issues with the IAEA; and swiftly meet all IAEA requirements, in particular
   i. to once again implement the modified Code 3.1;
   ii. to once again implement and ratify the Additional Protocol; and,
   iii. to provide swift access to the Parchin Military Complex;

d. to demonstrate its willingness to find a diplomatic solution by committing to further confidence-building measures, including
   i. a cessation of uranium enrichment to levels slightly below 20% uranium-235;
   ii. shipping all uranium enriched to this level out of the country for fuel fabrication; and
   iii. freezing enrichment in the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;

e. to refrain from statements and actions that undermine the credibility of the IAEA and its personnel;

f. to refrain from actions that could be seen as pretexts to enrich uranium to levels even higher than 20% uranium-235, possibly even weapons-grade, for example to commit to building nuclear-powered sea vessels and submarines;

g. to refrain from making explicit or implicit threats of military aggression against any and all NATO members and partner states;

h. to work with the international community in promoting regional security and stability;

11. **URGES** all states:

a. to continue and increase their efforts to fully abide by the UN Security Council sanctions placed on Iran.